On-Site Inspections

A visit, of limited duration, by an inspection team to an area, site or facility to verify compliance. There are various types, including routine, short-notice, random and challenge. (Handbook, p. 126)

Inspections carried out by designated inspectors to verify that particular activities prohibited by an arms limitation agreement are not performed, to check that particular activities prescribed by an arms limitation agreement are implemented, or to examine the nature of a suspicious event. OSIs can be divided into three main categories: ad hoc inspections, non-challenge inspections and challenge inspections. Continuous monitoring carried out by personnel may also be classified as OSIs. OSIs are often used to supplement data declarations. Together, these two measures form the main instruments of cooperative monitoring. The application of OSIs requires the mutual consent of all parties. Generally OSIs are considered to be one of the most intrusive instruments of verification, and hence tend to be among the most contentious measures to negotiate and, as demonstrated by the experience of the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM), to implement. (Lexicon, p.219-220)

Form of on-site inspections conducted on an unpredictable basis. Such inspections are typically applied in combination with routine inspections. Their aim is to enhance the capacity of a verification regime to detect non-compliance with treaty obligations by subjecting declared facilities to the possibility of unexpected (i.e., non-routine) inspection. In other cases, such as under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, ad hoc inspections are carried out in the initial period of a treaty’s application, prior to further negotiations on detailed implementation approaches at specific facilities. (Lexicon, p. 207-208)

Non-challenge inspections are on-site visits conducted on a periodic basis or in accordance with some predetermined arrangement. These inspections are the most common type of on-site inspections. They are typically used to check inventories of treaty-limited items, the progress of the elimination of treaty-prohibited equipment, and/or the activities of declared facilities in order to verify that treaty-prohibited events are not taking place. Depending on the specifics of the agreement, regular on-site inspections can take several forms including routine inspections, clarification visits, baseline inspections, reduction inspections, closeout inspections, and short-notice inspections. (Lexicon, p. 188)

A type of on-site inspection conducted to investigate credible evidence of non-compliance. In multilateral regimes such an inspection may be requested by any state party, but must be approved by the treaty’s executive body before it proceeds. Usually the requested state will not have a right of refusal. Likely to be rare and controversial. (Handbook, 117)

Challenge inspections are the most contentious type of inspection as they imply that a violation has or may have occurred. Their goal is to help provide evidence that will confirm or deny an allegation of noncompliance. In theory, the notification period for such inspections should be short, so that parties cannot remove or hide evidence. In practice, the speed with which an inspection can be mounted is limited by the need for approval to be granted for the inspection to proceed and the time required for inspectors to travel to the site, gain entry and establish themselves and their equipment. Although every State party is required to cooperate fully with a challenge inspection, it is likely to be such an unusual and politically contentious event that the receiving State may not fully cooperate in making the necessary arrangements. This may range from being overly legalistic to deliberately delaying or obstructing the inspection. The time between the request being made for a challenge inspection and the commencement of the inspection on-site is likely to be longer than short-notice inspections in a non-challenge environment. (Handbook, p. 25)

Agreements may use specific terms to refer to “challenge inspections”. For example, in the context of IAEA safeguards, they are called “Special Inspections”, and in the context of START I there are two types of challenge inspections, “Visit with special right of access” (SAV) and “Suspect Site Inspections”. (Handbook, p. 129; Lexicon, p. 225-226)

An agreed number of inspections that may be conducted in a particular period, in a specified country or at specified sites or facilities. Used to limit the number of inspections in order to reduce their cost, inconvenience and intrusiveness and to prevent an unfair burden falling on a particular party or parties. May be active (the number that a party is allowed to conduct on the territory of other states) or passive (the number of inspections it is obliged to receive). Provided for in the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. (Handbook, p. 123)

Under the CFE Treaty the quota inspections permissible is calculated on an individual basis for each party as a percentage of the number of objects of verification (OOVs) present on its territory. Under the INF Treaty a fixed quota of inspections was used to verify the absence of treaty-limited items at declared or formerly declared missile operating bases or missile support facilities. Under the Treaty on Open skies, so-called active and passive quotas calculated in function of the size of the territory of each party, indicate respectively how many overflights a party may conduct and receive each year. (Lexicon, p. 221)

Procedures and techniques that a treaty permits an inspected party to use in order to limit access by on-site inspectors to sensitive areas and equipment. Designed to prevent inspectors obtaining information unrelated to their mission, especially national security information or commercial proprietary information (commercial secrets). (Handbook, p. 124)

Provision under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) concerning the extent and nature of access to a particular place or places during a challenge inspection. The inspected party must allow the greatest possible degree of access, but has the right to manage access to protect national security and sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to chemical weapons. If the inspected party provides less than full access to places, activities, or information, it must make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means by which to clarify the noncompliance concern that triggered the inspection. (Lexicon, p. 217)