International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Mandate

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, according to Article II of its Statute seeks “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”, while also ensuring that any assistance it provides is not “used in such a way as to further any military purpose”1. In line with this mandate, Article III A.1 authorizes the Agency “to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world”2. The IAEA operates as both a facilitator of nuclear cooperation and as a technical body ensuring that nuclear technology is used safely and solely for peaceful purposes. It functions within a legal and technical framework grounded in its Statute and agreements concluded with states, including safeguards agreements, which are central to verifying compliance with non-proliferation obligations. In performing its duties, the Agency acts in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and with due regard for the sovereign rights of states, as highlighted in Article III.D of the Statute3. 

Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are required to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted for non-peaceful purposes. These agreements require states to submit detailed baseline declarations on the location, quantity, and technical specifications of nuclear material and facilities, along with regular updates on inventories, modifications, and material transfers—whether domestic or international. To verify the correctness and completeness of state declarations the IAEA implements a comprehensive inspection system that includes ad hoc, routine, and short-notice inspections—such as baseline inspections, inventory verification, and data update visits—supported by technical tools like tags, seals, sensors, and continuous monitoring, all designed to provide credible assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted. The extent of these inspections will vary depending on the agreement between the agency and the state. 

The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) aims to ensure that all nuclear material in NNWS remains in peaceful use, their capacity to verify not only the correctness but also completeness has been enhanced by the introduction of the Additional Protocol (AP), which grants the IAEA broader access to information and sites to detect undeclared material or activities. Although nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are not bound by the same NPT requirements, all five (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) have adopted Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs) that allow IAEA inspections from eligible facilities to promote transparency. There are also Item-Specific Safeguards Agreements which are applied in three States (India, Israel and Pakistan) that are not party to the NPT. It covers “nuclear material, non-nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the safeguards agreements” 4. Under such agreements, states commit “not to use nuclear material, facilities or other items subject to the agreement for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose”. 5 For states with minimal or no nuclear material and no facilities, the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) offers a simplified safeguards regime, though its scope was revised in 2005 to strengthen its provisions and limit its applicability6. 

In carrying out its verification mandate, the IAEA Secretariat typically engages directly with states to clarify anomalies or compliance concerns. If these cannot be satisfactorily addressed, the matter is referred to the IAEA Board of Governors, which may determine that a state is in non-compliance. In such cases, the Board may report its findings to the Agency’s Member States, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). As stipulated in Article II B 4 of the IAEA Statute, the Agency is required to “submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council”. Furthermore, “if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council [...] and may also take the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of Article XII” 7. Additionally, under Article II B 5, the IAEA may “submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other organs of the United Nations on matters within the competence of these organs”.8 Complementing these mechanisms, INFCIRC/153—the model comprehensive safeguards agreement—provides a dispute resolution process, including the option to establish an arbitral tribunal at the International Court of Justice.9 

The IAEA plays a supportive and reference role in several key nuclear governance bodies. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which coordinates export controls for nuclear-related materials, frequently references IAEA safeguards in its guidelines to ensure that nuclear trade does not contribute to proliferation. Similarly, the Zangger Committee, tasked with interpreting Article III.2 of the NPT and coordinating export controls, relies on IAEA safeguards as a standard for compliance. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), responsible for verifying compliance with the CTBT, is also supported by the IAEA, which contributes technical expertise and coordination, particularly in verification and monitoring efforts.