International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Mandate

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and prevent its diversion to military purposes.26 According to Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute, the Agency is authorized to:

“establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy”.

The IAEA operates both as a facilitator of nuclear cooperation and as a technical body. The IAEA safeguards system has the objectives of timely detection of the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and providing credible assurance that States are abiding by their international commitments.27

The IAEA applies safeguards in three circumstances: (1) when a state receives nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities through the Agency; (2) when a state requests safeguards under bilateral or multilateral arrangements; or (3) when a state voluntarily submits all or some of its nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.28

In the 1950s-1960s, IAEA safeguards focused on ensuring that nuclear trade did not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons. This system was first codified in document INFCIRC/26 (1961) and later in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (1968), which remains in use by a few states.29 These item-specific agreements cover “nuclear material, non-nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the safeguards agreements” and “prohibits the use of the specified items in such a way as to further any military purpose”.30

Under Article III of the NPT, NNWS must conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, granting it the right and obligation to apply safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear activities within the State’s territory, jurisdiction, or control. These agreements, based on INFCIRC/153, include CSAs and Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs). Although nuclear-weapon States (NWS) are not required to conclude CSAs, all five have signed VOAs, permitting safeguards on selected nuclear material and facilities in their civilian fuel cycles. VOAs apply only to material and facilities offered by the State and selected by the IAEA for application of safeguards.31

In the late 1990s, the IAEA introduced strengthened safeguards through the Model Additional Protocol, based on INFCIRC/540. Over 140 states have adopted additional protocols.32 For States with a CSA, the AP includes all measures in INFCIRC/540; for States with item-specific agreements or VOAs, it includes those measures accepted by the State.33

For states with minimal or no nuclear material in a facility or no facilities, the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) is a simplified safeguards regime. Its scope was revised in 2005 to strengthen provisions and limit applicability34.

The IAEA now applies a State-level approach, integrating all safeguards-relevant information to tailor verification activities to each State’s nuclear profile.35

The IAEA draws safeguards conclusions based on the type of agreement in place:36

• CSA + AP: All nuclear materials remain in peaceful activities.

• CSA only: Declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. Item-specific agreements: Nuclear material, facilities, or other safeguarded items remain in peaceful activities.

• VOA: Nuclear material in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreement.

In carrying out its verification mandate, the IAEA Secretariat typically engages directly with states to clarify anomalies or compliance concerns. If these cannot be satisfactorily addressed, the matter is referred to the IAEA Board of Governors, which may determine that a state is in non-compliance. In such cases, the Board may report its findings to the Agency’s Member States, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). As stipulated in Article II B 4 of the IAEA Statute, the Agency is required to “submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council”. Furthermore, “if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council [...] and may also take the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of Article XII”.37 Complementing these mechanisms, INFCIRC/153—the model comprehensive safeguards agreement—provides a dispute resolution process, including the option to establish an arbitral tribunal at the International Court of Justice.38