Definition
In 1990, the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts, in their report on the “Study on the Role of the United Nations in Verification”, noted that verification can create confidence on disarmament and arms limitation agreements:
“Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties.” (A/45/372, para. 5, p. 17)
The report noted that one of the functions of verification is providing confidence in compliance:
“Verification provisions have several important functions, beginning with the assessment of how implementation of arms limitation and disarmament is proceeding. For this process to succeed in the long term, verification provisions must provide for confidence in compliance. Confidence in compliance is based not just on being able to detect violations in time for States parties to take appropriate action, but also on confidence that verification provisions are so well designed that they will help prevent cheating from taking place.” (A/45/372, para. 24, p. 24)
And further explained how confidence is generated through verification provisions (i.e., collection of information):
“Verification arrangements must serve another function by generating confidence rather than distrust within participating States that others are fulfilling their obligations under an agreement. An important element for building confidence is the ability to collect information relative to the agreement in question sufficient to assess the compliance practices of other States. Confidence can also be built when verification provisions allow others to demonstrate clearly their commitment to compliance.” (A/45/372, para. 28, p. 25)
In 2019, the Group of Governmental Experts, in their report “to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament”, acknowledged the importance of confidence in a verification regime for nuclear disarmament agreements:
“A credible verification regime in which all States have confidence will be essential for maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.” (A/74/90, para. 39, p. 14)
And noted that:
“Effective verification could contribute to trust and confidence.” (A/74/90, para. 6, p. 9)
In 2023, the Group of Governmental Experts, in their report “to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues”, recognized that:
“verification helps build confidence that a treaty, agreement or arrangement are being implemented and all its parties are meeting their commitments and obligations, and thereby assists in maintaining political and other support for ongoing and future nuclear disarmament efforts, greater predictability and transparency with regard to the treaty implementation of States, and facilitating mutual confidence, trust and understanding, easing tensions, and reducing the risk of misperception.” (A/78/120, para. 20, p. 11)